The Eggshell Skull Rule
The Eggshell Skull rule deals with plaintiffs that have pre-existing medical conditions. An injured person is entitled to recover full compensation for all damages that proximately result from a defendant’s tortious act, even if some or all of the injuries might not have occurred but for the plaintiff’s preexisting physical condition, disease, or susceptibility to injury.
“[T]he familiar but accurate doctrine [is] that ‘the tort feasor takes the plaintiff as he finds him’ ….” See Silva v. Stein, 527 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). In other words, the foreseeability to the defendant, that the plaintiff might be injured by his conduct, does not affect the defendant’s liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.
“One of the illustrations which runs through the English cases is that of the plaintiff with the ‘eggshell skull,’ who suffers death where a normal person would have had only a bump on the head.” Silva, 527 So. 2d at 944 (quotation omitted).
This is the so-called eggshell skull rule, which according to law professors, was first enunciated in a 1901 English case. See Dulieu v. White & Sons, (1901) 2 K.B. 669 (plaintiff died from contact caused by defendant where the ordinary person would have suffered only a bump to the head).
“The tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. That is the ‘eggshell skull’ rule …. So if you kick someone and unbeknownst to you he has a serious infection at the spot in which you kick him and as a result he dies of septicemia, you are fully liable for his death even though you could not have foreseen such a consequence from the kick.” Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2008).
The rule is virtually universally applied today, including in Florida. See Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 43, at 292 (5th ed. 1984) (“There is almost universal agreement upon liability beyond the risk, for quite unforeseeable consequences, when they follow an impact upon the person of the plaintiff.”). See also, Mowbray v. Carnival Corp., No. 08-20931-CIV, 2009 WL 10667070, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2009) (“Because ‘a tort-feasor takes his victim as he finds’ her, [the victim’s] anemia is relevant to the issue of damages, and thus this evidence is not excluded.”).
The eggshell skull rule applies even if the resulting injuries would inevitably have occurred sooner or later regardless of the defendant’s negligence. See 2 Stein on Personal Injury Damages Treatise § 11:1 (3d ed.) (2020). However, if the defendant can prove this would have been the case, it may have an impact on the amount of damages awarded. Id.
For example, in Richman, deputy sheriffs were sued for violating the federal constitutional rights of the plaintiff’s son who died resisting arrest. Richman, 512 F.3d at 879. The deputies argued that they should not be liable because the plaintiff’s son had a condition that already diminished his life expectancy. Id. at 884.
However, the Court held the nature and extent of the son’s injury was irrelevant to their liability for damages. Richman, 512 F.3d at 884. The Court stated “[b]ecause of his infirmities, Richman did not have a normal life expectancy. But the force used against him by the swarm of deputies accelerated his death; how soon he would have died from causes unrelated to the use of that force is relevant only to damages.” Id. (emphasis added).
In this regard, “the ‘eggshell skull’ rule is a rule both of proximate cause and of damages—the defendant is responsible even though no injury may have been foreseeable and even though the damages incurred were much more extensive than ordinarily would have been foreseeable.” See 2 Stein on Personal Injury Damages Treatise § 11:1 (3d ed. 2020).
In Johnson v. Clark, 484 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2007), “the Plaintiff’s evidence of emotional injury was fairly substantial and was corroborated by the testimony of his treating psychiatrist and other witnesses. The evidence was that Plaintiff, like the plaintiff with the ‘eggshell skull’ discussed in law-school classes, was relatively fragile and easily damaged by the type of attacks in which Defendant engaged. The Court disagrees with Defendant’s contention that the damages award [for mental pain and suffering] should be remitted to a ‘nominal’ amount.”
In short, the defendant is responsible for whatever adverse consequences the plaintiff suffers—whether they are “foreseeable” or not. For example, in Silva v. Stein, 527 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), “[a]s a result of what the jury found was the negligent application of a permanent wave by the [defendant’s] employee—notwithstanding that Ms. Stein informed the beautician that she was adversely susceptible to the chemical solution required—Ms. Stein sustained a severe immunological reaction which was literally unprecedented in medical history.” Silva v. Stein, 527 So. 2d 943, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). “On this ground, the defendant beauty shop owner claims that since the extent of the plaintiff’s injury was thus ‘unforeseeable,’ the defendant is not liable.” Id.
However, the Court found “[t]his contention and that reliance are entirely misplaced in this situation.” Silva, 527 So. 2d at 943. “Stahl’s foreseeability and proximate cause principles are applicable only in the determination of the defendant’s liability for the initial adverse contact with the plaintiff.” Id. “They have no pertinence to the issue of whether, once that contact has occurred, the defendant is responsible for whatever adverse consequences the plaintiff suffers—whether they are ‘foreseeable’ or not.” Id. at 943–44 (emphasis added). “It is the familiar but accurate doctrine that ‘the tort feasor takes the plaintiff as he finds him’ which is instead controlling.” Id. at 944.