The Standard for Motions to Dismiss in Federal Court

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), applicable to civil litigation in Federal Courts, empowers the court to grant motions to dismiss when a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need only be “a short and plain statement of the claim,” and as long as the pleadings “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” notice pleading has been satisfied. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).

Thus, motions to dismiss should not be granted unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim entitling it to relief. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations … a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[T]he standard ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’ of the required element.” Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).

When a plaintiff “[has] not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. When reviewing motions to dismiss, “the court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.” Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016). However, this only applies to factual allegations and not “legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Ordinarily, the court only looks to the complaint and its exhibits to resolve motions to dismiss. However, for cases in the Eleventh Circuit, “[o]ur Rule 12(b)(6) decisions have adopted the ‘incorporation by reference’ doctrine, under which a document attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered by the court without converting the motion into one for summary judgment only if the attached document is: (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (2) undisputed.” Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). “‘Undisputed’ in this context means that the authenticity of the document is not challenged.” Id. (citations omitted).